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ABSTRACT 
Inspired by the first lustrum of the Club Positioning Matrix (CPM) for professional Dutch soccer teams, we model the 
interaction between soccer teams and their potential fans as a cooperative cost game based on the annual voluntary 
sponsorships of fans in order to validate their fan registration in a central database. We introduce a natural cost alloca-
tion to the soccer teams, based in a natural manner on the sponsorships of fans. The game theoretic approach is twofold. 
On the one hand, an appropriate cost game called “fan data cost game” is developed and on the other, it is shown that 
the former natural cost allocation agrees with the solution concept called “nucleolus” of the fan data cost game. 
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1. Club Positioning Matrix (CPM) of  
Professional Dutch Soccer 
Five years CPM. The first lustrum of the (Dutch) “Eredi-
visie Effectenbeurs”is a fact. At the initiative of the pro-
fessional teams in the Dutch soccer league called “Eredi-
visie”, the first CPM research has been carried out Octo-
ber 2006 by one of the German leading research and 
consultancy companies in international sport business 
(i.e., marketing and sponsoring) called “Sport + Markt” 
(www.sportundmarkt.com). October 2009 the fourth 
CPM research involved 4.500 participants randomly se-
lected from the whole Dutch population (with the com-
mon feature to be a fan of soccer). Since these eighteen 
soccer teams were not satisfied at all by the point of time 
October, the fifth CPM research edition has been carried 
out among 4.500 participants in two stages, namely Au-
gust 2010 at the beginning of the soccer season and 
January 2011 during the soccer winter break. The end of 
March 2011, the CPM 2011 scores have been sent to the 
professional Dutch soccer teams and published exclu-
sively in the weekly Dutch soccer magazine “Voetbal 
International” (www.vi.nl) [1]. 
The CPM 2011 scores have direct consequences for 
the participating soccer teams since the allocation of me-
dia (television and broadcast) money among all the soc-
cer teams is based equally on both the annual sport re-
sults and the average CPM scores over three years. The 
more CPM points, the more media money. During one 
half of a century, the annual sport results were dominated 
fully by the triple PSV Eindhoven (last Dutch champi-
onships in 2000, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008), 
Ajax Amsterdam (2002, 2004, 2011), and Feyenoord 
Rotterdam (1974, 1984, 1993, 1999), with exceptions 
caused by DWS in 1964, AZ'67 Alkmaar in 1981 as well 
as 2009, and FC Twente Enschede in 2010. The top five 
of the last three annual sport results are listed in Table 1. 
The annual CPM is a marketing instrument that meas-
ures the marketing value (through a professional jury of 
marketing specialists) as well as the imago of every pro-
fessional soccer team (through the randomly selected 
soccer fans), which, in turn, is determined on the basis of 
six parts. Finally, the marketing value, the imago, and the 
annual sport result are put into some calculation model 
yielding the annual CPM scores.  
The top five of the best marketing is as follows: 1) 
PSV; 2) SC Heerenveen; 3) FC Twente; 4) Ajax; 5) 
Feyenoord. Like the fourth edition, the team with the best 
imago is FC Twente due to its unique national champi-
onship, its successful participation in the international 
Champions League as well as the European League (till 
the quarter finales), and its new stadium called Grolsch 
Veste. FC Twente’s imago is the best in the subfields 
attraction (charm), fascination, economical success, and 
the second best in the subfields emotional involvement 
and identification. The top six of the best imago is as 
follows: 1) FC Twente 699; 2) Ajax 641; 3) PSV 624; 4) 
SC Heerenveen 558; 5) FC Groningen 539; 6) Feyenoord 
476.  
In summary, the CPM score of FC Twente increased 
drastic, Feyenoord’s score decreased drastic, so that the 
third ranking in the CPM 2011 scores is occupied by FC  
Copyright © 2012 SciRes.                                                                                  AM 
D. S. HOU  ET  AL. 87
 
Table 1. The top five of the last three annual sport results is as follows (R = ranking). 
R 2010-2011 Score 2009-2010 Score 2008-2009 Score 
1 Ajax 73 FC Twente 86 AZ'67 80 
2 FC Twente 71 Ajax 85 FC Twente 69 
3 PSV 69 PSV 78 Ajax 68 
4 AZ'67 59 Feyenoord 63 PSV 65 
5 FC Groningen 57 AZ'67 62 SC Heerenveen 60 
 
Twente. Ajax and PSV remain first and second due to the 
CPM results of the previous years. The top seven of the 
last three final CPM rankings are listed in Table 2. 
Concerning the fanstatus, the CPM 2011 top five is as 
follows: 1) Ajax; 2) Feyenoord; 3) PSV; 4) FC Twente; 5) 
AZ’67. During the first CPM research October 2006, FC 
Twente started with a fanstatus of 250.000 fans, nowa- 
days its fanstatus has been increased up to about 1.6 mil- 
lion, being the double of its previous edition. 
2. The Fan Database Model 
Given the current fan status as the model of the interac-
tion between the professional Dutch soccer teams and 
their potential fans, our main goal is to apply the solution 
part of the mathematical field called “cooperative game 
theory”. The so-called “players” are the soccer teams, 
each of which is endowed with a set of potential fans, 
each of which is supposed to validate its fan registration 
in a central database through an annual voluntary spon-
sorship to be cashed to the national soccer association. 
This annual sponsorship is said to be voluntary since it 
varies from fan to fan, each fan decides by him/herself 
about the contribution to be small or large. No registra-
tion if the potential fan is not willing to fulfill this spon-
sorship. In fact, any commitment to this sponsorship 
guarantees certain priorities to the fan, such as priority 
rights to purchase tickets for additional (inter)national 
soccer matches with or without discount, program book-
lets free of charge, and so on. Notice that any fan is al-
lowed to be registrated (in a central database run by the 
national soccer association) for a number of distinct soc-
cer teams (not necessarily one team), while contributing 
the annual voluntary sponsorship once (at the beginning 
of the soccer season). Table 3 surveys the essential no- 
tions about soccer teams and fans. 
In summary, the fan database of professional Dutch 
soccer teams may be modeled as the triple      , ,i ji N j F  such that the “player set”  
consists of the soccer teams, the set i
N F S N
F  consists of fans 
of soccer team and  represents the annual vol-
untary sponsorship of fan  In fact, these sponsorships 
are combined to construct the following cost allocation 
,i 0jS 
.j
  .niy  y i N  In the sequel let R X  denote the car-
dinality of any finite set .X  Consider the budget  as 
the sum of sponsorships of fans with a unique (unspecified) 
favourite soccer team (that is,  with 
B
j F 1N j  ). 
Firstly, factorize this budget in accordance with the ap-
pearance of the unique soccer team involved, that is 
,ii NB b   with the understanding that 0ib   if 
there are no fans j F  with unique favourite soccer 
team  Secondly, with reference to these factorizations, 
determine the deviations with respect to their average. In 
summary, charge to soccer team  the cost allocation  
.i
i
amounting i
By
N i
b  
 
 for  all i n words, reward 
to soccer team i  the negative amount ib , and charge 
N . I
the budget B  qually among all the soccer teams. In 
particular, a soccer team i  receives a reward (instead of 
a cost charge) if and only if the total sponsorship ib  
exceeds the average 
e
B  of the budget. The larger 
N
,  
reward to socc That r 
3. The Fan Data Cost Game 
ocatio
ib
the larger the er team .i
t all
  is, socce
n 
teams benefit from fans who are willing to contribute a 
large sponsorship. Table 4 surveys the essential notions 
in the setting of cost allocations. 
Our main goal is to support the cos  iy i N  
hefrom the viewpoint of cooperative game theory  
so-called nucleolus [2] of the suitably chosen fan data 
cost game 
 as t
,N c . Table 5 surveys the essential notions 
in the settin n data cost game. 
Definition 3.1. The coalitional cost
g of fa
  c S  of any 
non-empty coalition S N  represents the loss (short-
age) of coalitional sponsorship versus total sponsorship. 
That is, the fan data cost game ,N c  is given by 
   ,c S s s s S N S
\
 for 
S S
j j
j F j F j F F
allj 
  
       (3
operate t
.1) 
Note that the soccer team o o 
sh
s are willing to c
are the fan data information of the central database in 
order to solve the minimization problem of shortages of 
sponsorships in that   0c N   reflecting the formation    
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 CPM rankings is as follows (R = nking). 
R CPM 2011 Score CPM 2010 Score CPM 2009 Score 
Table 2. The top seven of the last three final  ra
1 Ajax 2.928 Ajax 2.888 Ajax 2.791 
2 PSV 2.649 PSV 2.568 PSV 2.656 
3 FC d d 
SC Heerenveen 
SC Heerenveen SC Heerenveen 
Twente 2.269 Feyenoor 2.237 Feyenoor 2.255 
4 Feyenoord 2.199 AZ'67 2.106 AZ'67 2.165 
5 AZ'67 2.086 FC Twente 2.059 2.104 
6 2.071 1.943 FC Groningen 1.804 
7 FC Groningen 1.780 FC Groningen 1.552 FC Twente 1.661 
 
Table 3. The essential notions about soccer teams and fans. 
Symbol Notation Interpretation 
N  i N  set of soccer tea  i called player ms; soccer team
iF  ij F  set of i  fans of soccer team i; fan j of soccer team 
i N iF F   ij F  set of all fans; fan j 
0jS    annual voluntary sponsorship of egistration 
}
fan j in order to validate the fan r
jN  { | ii N j F   set of soccer teams of which j is a fan; equivalence: i N j F    j
 
Table 4. The essential notions in the setting of cost allocations. 
Formula Interpretation 
, 1j jj F N
B s   sponsorship of fans with a unique ourite soccer team. unspecified fav
, { }ji jj F N i
b s   sponsorship of fans with the unique specified favourite soccer team ,i i iN  
i i
By b
N
   cost allocation charged to soccer team ,i i N  
 
Table 5. The essential notions in the setting of fan data cost game. 
Formula Interpretation 
i N  Soccer t yer. eam i called pla
S N  Subse tion. 
i
t of soccer teams, called coali
i S  Soccer team i of coalition S. 
S i SF F   Subset o m of S. 
Annual volunta n registration. 
f fans of at least one soccer tea
0js   ry sponsorship of fan j in order to validate the fa
j
j F
s

  Total sponsorship of all fans. 
S
j
j F
s

  Coalitional sponsorship of fans of at least one soccer team of S. 
S
j j
j F j F
s s
 
   Coalitional loss (shortage) of sponsorship of soccer teams of coalition S 
Fan data cost of coalition S. 
Motivation for cooperation to form the grand coalition N due to minimization of shortages of sponsorship. 
( )
S
j j
j F j F
c S s s
 
    
  0c N   
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The of the grand coalition .N  
oper
next preliminary Lemma 
reports two essential pr ties of the fan data cost game 
,N c .  
Lemma 3.2. Let ,N c  be the fan data cost game of 
(3.1). 
For all , ,S N S N S    ,  
 
\
 i
i N S
b

   c S or equivalently, by (3.1)      (3.2) 
}\ \ , {S j
j j
j F F i N S j F N i
s s             (3.3) 
   

 \{ } ic N i b  for all 
Proof. (3.3) follows im  from
i N .         (3.4) 
mediately  the inclusion  { }, \ \j SN i i N S F F    . In order to prov
follow
j F e 
(3.4), fix player . By (3.1), we 
tions: 
i N obtain the -
ing chain of equa
 \{ }
\{ }\ , { }N i j
j j i
F j F N i j F
c N i s s b

    . 
Here the second equality is due to the following 
equivalences (given i N ):  
{ }

j jN i i N    and jk N  for all \{ }k N i  
 and j  all ij F  kF  for \{ }N i   k
ij F   and \{ }N i  j F
\{ }\ .N iFj F   
4. The Nucleolus of the Fan Data Cost Game 
Our study of the nucleolus involves the notion of excess 
   , ii Te T c T x x , where , ,T N T N T    ,  
and   Ni i Nx R x . I that the level of tht turns out e  
n smallest excesses with respect to our cost allocatio y sed of all the i i Ny   is compo  1N  -person coa-
litions \{ }, .N i i N  Indeed, on the nd, by (3.4), 
and on other, by (3.2), it holds for all i N  and all 
, ,T N T N T
 one ha
 the 
   . 
   \{ }, \{ } k i i i
k N
Be N i c N i y y b y
N
     y   
and further 
     ,e T y
           
i i
i T i T
i
i N
Bc T y c T b T
N
B B Bb T B T
N N N
 

     
      
 

 
Hence, all  1N 
non-t
cost games, its nucleolus is fully solved by the  
-person coalitions have the small-
est excess among rivial coalitions with respect to 
our cost allocation y and according to Kohlberg’s crite-
rion [3], this suffices to conclude that our cost allocation 
y agrees with the nucleolus of the fan data cost game 
,N c  of the form (3.1). Thus, in the setting of fan data 
explicit form of our cost allocation ,i i
By b i N
N
   ,  
and so, numerical methods and computational complex-
ity are replaced by theoretical results due 
cant property (3.2) of the fan data cost e 
to the signifi-
 game. Clearly, th
Example 5.1. The four soccer teams of Ajax Amsterdam 
y-
 
number of constraints in (3.2) is the same as the expo-
nential number of non-trivial coalitions. According to the 
equivalent property (3.3), slight changes in the sponsor-
ships do not affect the strict inequalities and so, stability 
applies to some extent. 
5. A Four-Person Example of a Fan Data  
Cost Game 
(A), Olympique Lyon (L), Real Madrid (M), and D
namo Zagreb (Z) compete against each other within one
group during the first round of the Champions League 
2011-2012. Suppose that six television stations are ap-
pointed to broadcast the mutual matches such that the 
public Spanish TV station 3 is interested in all the four 
soccer teams, the public French TV station 2 is interested 
in every team except Zagreb, the national Dutch and 
Croatian TV stations 1 and 6 respectively only in their 
home team, similar to the local French and Spanish TV 
stations 4 and 5 respectively. That is, the data sets 
, , ,A L M ZF F F F  of fans of these four soccer teams are 
given by {1,2,3},AF   {2,3,4},LF   {2,3,5},MF    
{3,6}.ZF   Based on the existence of the TV stations 
1,4,5,6  with a unique specified favourite soccer team 
, , ,A L M e sponsorships , , ,Z , th 1 4 5 6s s s s  by these four 
TV statio e allocated to the corresponding soccer 
parable benefits , , ,A L M Zb b b b . In the second 
e total budget  
1 4 5 6A L M ZB b b b b s s s s
ns ar
teams as se
stage th
       is divided equal- 
ly among all the four soccer teams resulting in the alloca-
tions amounting 

14A
,By s   44L ,
By s   54M
B s   and y
6.4Z
By s   
This final allocation is supported by the gam etic 
approach as the solution concept called nucleolus of the 
fan data cost game 
e theor
,N c  listed  Table 6. Notice that 
the 
in
fourth column concerning the cost of any coalition is 
equal to the fifth column concerning the sum of separable 
benefits of the soccer teams in the complementary coali-
tion, except for coalition { }Z . The dominance of the 
fourth column to the fifth column is the most significant 
property (3.2) of the fan data cost game. 
The core of the fan data cost game is a quadrilateral 
with extreme points  1 4 5 6, , ,B s s s      , s
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Table 6. The essential notions in the example. 
S N  SF  \ SF F    \ S jFc S s j F  \ ii N S b  
{A} {1,2,3} {4,5,6} 4 5 6s s s   L M Zb b b   
{L} {2,3,4} {1,5,6} 1 5 6s s s   A M Zb b b   
{M} {2,3,5} {1,4,6} 1 4 6s s s   A L Zb b b   
{Z} {3,6} {1,2,4,5} 1 2 4 5s s s s    A L Mb b b   
{A,L} {1,2,3,4} {5,6} 5 6s s  M Zb b  
{  {  A,M} 1,2,3,5} {4,6} 4 6s s  L Zb b  
{A,Z} {1,2,3,6} {4,5} 4 5s s  L Mb b  
{L,M} {2,3,4,5} {1,6} 1 6s s  A Zb b  
{L,Z} {2,3,4,6} {1,5} 1 5s s  A Mb b  
{M,Z} {2,3,5,6} {1,4} 1 4s s  A Lb b  
{A,L,M} {1,2,3,4,5} {6} 6s  Zb  
{A,L,Z} {1,2,3,4,6} {5} 5s  Mb  
{A,M,Z} {1,2,3,5,6} {4} 4s  Lb  
{L,M,Z} {2,3,4,5,6} {1} 1s  Ab  
{  A,L,M,Z} {1,2,3,4,5,6}   0 0 
  1 4 6, , ,5 ,s B s s  s    1 64 5, , ,s s B s  s   and   , , ,1 4 5 6s s s B s    , where B s s s1 4 5 6.s
ort that the nucleolus 
with the center of gravity 
 station joins wit
   With- 
 rep of any 
des of 
out going into details, we
fan data cost game coinci
the core. In case a seventh TV h only 
interest in the Dutch team Ajax, then the separable bene-
fit of Ajax increases with the sponsorship s7 of the new 
TV station up to 1 7s s  whereas the final cost charge to 
Ajax lowers by 73 4s , that is the cost charge to any of 
the other three soccer teams increases with 7 4s . 
6. A Remark about the Core of the  
Sponsorship Game 
In the setting of the division problem of the to
B  among the soccer teams, it is natural to
nsorship game 
tal budget 
 study the 
spo ,N v  defined by 
 
S
j
j F
v S s

   for all ,S N S          (6.1) 
Clearly, straight from its definition,  Un-
sorship g drawback that 
  .v N B
urpose, co
 the game
fortunately, this spon ame has the 
its so-called “core” is empty. For that p nsider 
the set of “reasonable” payoff vectors of  con-
sisting of efficient payoff vectors   Ni i Nx R x  sat-
isfying  ii N x v N   as well as lower and upper 
bounds for the individual payoffs such that       { } \{ }iv i x v N v N i    for  the 
context hip game 
 all .i N  In
of the sponsors ,N v  of the form 
(6.1), it holds for  all i N  
   }
   
\{ }
, { }
N i
j
\{ }\
\{
                        
N i
j j j
F
v N v N i s s s 
 
j F j F j F
j i
j F N i
s b
  
 
    
  
So any reasonable payoff vector  satisfies x i ix b  
for all i N  and c ntly, by ming up, onseque sum   v N B . This contradicts the earlier observation   v N
and he
B . So,
nce, the 
 reason ayoff rs do no
core onsors game is em
(as a subset). 
ra heory
r to we 
refer to [5
NCES 
[2] D. Schmeidler, “ leolus of a Characteristic Func- 
tion Game,” Applied Mathematics, Vol. 
able p
of the sp
The Nuc
SIAM Journal of 
 vecto
hip 
t exist, 
pty too 
For an introductory book on coope tive game t , 
we refe [4]. For a paper with similar contents, 
]. 
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